ABSTRACT With the development of cloud storage, more data owners are inclined to outsource their data to cloud services. For privacy concerns, sensitive data should be encrypted before outsourcing. There are various searchable encryption schemes to ensure data availability. However, the existing search schemes pay little attention to the efficiency of data users' queries, especially for the multi-owner scenario. In this paper, we proposed a tree-based ranked multi-keyword search scheme for multiple data owners. Specifically, by considering a large amount of data in the cloud, we utilize the TF × IDF model to develop a multikeyword search and return the top-k ranked search results. To enable the cloud servers to perform a secure search without knowing any sensitive data (e.g., keywords and trapdoors), we construct a novel privacypreserving search protocol based on the bilinear mapping. To achieve an efficient search, for each data owner, a tree-based index encrypted with an additive order and privacy-preserving function family is constructed. The cloud server can then merge these indexes effectively, using the depth-first search algorithm to find the corresponding files. Finally, the rigorous security analysis proves that our scheme is secure, and the performance analysis demonstrates its efficacy and efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud storage enables ubiquitous, scalable, and on-demand network access to a shared pool of digital data resources [1] . More enterprises and individuals tend to outsource their personal data to the cloud server, and utilize query services to easily access data anytime, anywhere and on any device. As one exemplary popular cloud storage services, Dropbox has 500 million users and 8 million business customers as of December 2017. The Cisco survey predicts that the global storage capacity would reach 1.1ZB, which is almost twice the space available in 2017. Besides, the ''Cloud Storage Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) [2] - [15] is often considered as a way to guarantee data privacy and data efficiency. However, various data owners encrypt their data with different keys leading to the following two drawbacks: (1) data users need to manage multiple keys for different data owners; (2) data users need to generate multiple trapdoors for data owners' data even for the same query condition. In this paper, we focus on multiple data owners top-k query, whereby the cloud server can merge multiple data indexes encrypted with different keys and efficiently support top-k query.
A. MOTIVATION
Data sharing is another crucial utility function, i.e., sharing data files with each other. In personal health record system, data user (e.g., a patient) should have the ability to access his/her top-k data files about a specific case from different data owners (e.g., health monitors, hospitals, doctors). Similarly, the employees in an enterprise should have the ability to search data files outsourced by other employees.
Recent work [16] proposed a privacy-preserving ranked multi-keyword search in a multi-user model (PRMSM), which addresses the multi-keyword search problem in the multiple data owners model. However, PRMSM is inefficient and potentially expensive for frequent queries due to matching various ciphertexts from different data owners even for the same query.
B. CHALLENGE
In contrast to the single-user scenario, developing an efficient scheme for multiple data owners becomes a new challenge. To implement privacy preservation and efficient searches, we commonly build a tree-based index structure for each data owner's encrypted data. For a specific query condition, data users need to generate a trapdoor for each data owner, and the cloud should also search each index. This is obviously inefficient, due to the linear relationship of the number of trapdoors and data owners. A simple way to overcome this limitation is to let each data owner utilize the same key to encrypt their data files. Nevertheless, any one of the owners being compromised may lead to a system crash.
C. APPROACH
In this paper, we consider a multi-source cloud system, in which each data owner (viewed as a source) generates a tree-based index for his/her data files and encrypts these data with his/her corresponding key. To implement both privacy preservation and efficiency searches, we propose an efficient tree-based ranked multi-keyword search scheme (TBMSM). In this scheme, the cloud server is allowed to effectively merge multiple encrypted indexes, and securely perform the multi-keyword search without revealing the data owners' sensitive information, neither data files nor the queries. We construct a novel search protocol based on bilinear pairing, which enables different data owners to use different keys to encrypt their keywords and trapdoors. In order to rank the search results, we utilize the TF × IDF scheme to model relevance scores of data files and propose a ''Depth-First Search''(DFS) algorithm to obtain the ranked results. Finally, we confirm the security and efficiency of our scheme through comprehensive theoretical analysis and extensive experiments with a real dataset.
D. CONTRIBUTIONS
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions: 1) We construct a novel privacy-preserving search protocol, which allows the cloud server to perform an efficient secure multi-keyword ranked search without knowing data owners' sensitive information. 2) To achieve query efficiency, we introduce a consolidation strategy to implement multiple index trees. With this strategy, each data owner can encrypt their own tree-based index, and the cloud can be permitted to effectively merge indexes without knowing index contents. 3) We perform extensive experiments to evaluate the efficiency of the TBMSM scheme on a real-world dataset and achieve a logarithmic search time.
E. ROADMAP
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we review the related work in section II. Then, we formulate the problem in section III and introduce the proposed scheme in section IV. Section V presents security and performance analysis. Section VI presents the performance evaluation. Finally, we conclude the paper in section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review two categories of related work: searchable encryption and order-preserving encryption.
A. SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION
Searchable encryption provides a secure search service over encrypted data. Song et al. [2] proposed the searchable symmetric encryption(SSE) scheme that achieved ciphertext search. Goh [3] proposed a more secure SSE scheme using Bloom filter. However, a false positive may cause misjudgment [4] . Later, Curtmola et al. [5] proposed other schemes: SSE-1 and SSE-2. In term of efficiency, SSE-1 was better than SSE-2. In term of security, SSE-2 was safer. However, these works mostly focus on the single keyword or boolean search and don't support ranked search. Wang et al. [7] raised a secure ranked keyword search scheme which returned the top-k relevant files and was only designed only for singlekeyword search. The multi-keyword ranked search allows users to input multiple query keywords for personalized queries. In [9] , Cao et al. proposed the first secure multi-keyword ranked search scheme over encrypted cloud data (MRSE), and the documents are ranked by the ''inner product'' between file vectors and query vectors. However, they do not consider the weight of different keywords. The work of [10] - [12] enriched the multi-keyword search. Wang et al. [13] , Chuah and Hu [14] proposed multi-keyword fuzzy search scheme aimed at the tolerance of both slight typos and format inconsistencies for users' input. Zhang et al. [16] proposed a secure ranked multikeyword search scheme in a multi-owner model (PRMSM) that not only allows the cloud server to perform a multikeyword search without knowing any sensitive information, but also enable the data owner to flexibly change the encryption key. However, these schemes rarely focus on query efficiency.
Practically, query efficiency is one of the most important indicators of the user experience. Kamara and Papamanthou [17] proposed a secure search scheme based on the tree-based index, which can efficiently perform searches. However, it is designed only for a single keyword search. Later, Xu et al. [18] , [20] presented an efficient multi-keyword ranked search scheme (MKQE) that enabled a dynamic keyword dictionary and improved the precision of the search. Sun et al. [19] created a privacypreserving multi-keyword text search scheme. They divided the vector index into multiple layers and proposed a treebased index structure by applying the MD-algorithm [21] that VOLUME 6, 2018 realized more efficient search functionality, yet resulting in a loss of precision. Xia et al. [22] constructed a tree-based index structure and proposed a greedy depth-first search (GDFS) algorithm that achieved higher search efficiency. Unfortunately, these works don't consider multiple data owners scenario. Dong et al. [23] considered a practical scenario where multiple users share data via an untrusted third party. To implement it, the authors proposed a novel multi-user searchable data encryption scheme based on proxy cryptography. Different from the existing searchable encryption schemes, their scheme allowed the users to update the shared data set and each user can be reader and writer simultaneouly. Furthermore, the rigious proof had been represented to prove the security of their scheme. Popa et al. [24] focused on web applications and proposed a new platform Mylar which is a combination of system techniques and novel cryptographic primitives, including data sharing, computing over encrypted data and verifying application code. The results with 6 applications showed that Mylar is a good multi-user web application with data sharing. Cui et al. [25] proposed a secure and effective Near-duplicate detection (NDD) system over encrypted in-network storage which supported multi-user and multi-key searchable encryption. However, those schemes cannot solve the multi-keyword ranked search problem in the multi-user setting. Therefore, their schemes cannot directly be deployed for addressing our problem. In [26] , Yao et al. proposed a multi-source encrypted indexes merge (MEIM) mechanism, where the cloud can merge the encrypted indexes from data owners without knowing the index content. They focused on personal health records, and only considered a numerical ''attribute value'' for each attribute while ignoring queries on data files that must be built on vectors.
B. ORDER-PRESERVING ENCRYPTION
The order-preserving encryption (OPE) is used to preserve numerical order for plaintexts [27] . Boneh et al. [28] , [29] proposed the order-revealing encryption (ORE) schemes to achieve the best-possible security. In [30] , Chenette et al. built the first efficiently implementable order-revealing encryption. Yao et al. [31] proposed a novel multiple order-preserving symmetric encryption (MOPSE) scheme to encrypt personal health record under the multi-user setting. However, these schemes cannot support additive orderpreserving. In addition, Yi et al. [32] proposed an orderpreserving function to encode data from different sensors in the sensor network. Nevertheless, it only considered range queries while ignoring the multi-keyword ranked search.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION A. SYSTEM MODEL
In Fig. 1 , three entities, i.e., data owners, the cloud server, and data users, make up this system model. Data owners have a large collection of files F. To enable efficient multi-keyword search on the encrypted files, each data owner first builds a secure searchable tree-based index I . Then, data owners encrypt their data files F with their keys and outsource both the encrypted tree-based index and data files to the cloud server. When receiving the tree-based indexes, the cloud server merges multiple encrypted indexes without compromising data owners' privacy. When the data user searches t keywords over the encrypted files and fetch k encrypted files, he first computes the trapdoors T , and submits T and k to the cloud server. When receiving the trapdoors T and k, the cloud server begins searching the merged index tree I and returns the corresponding collection of the top-k ranked encrypted files.
B. THREAT MODEL
In the TBMSM, we assume both data owners and data users are trusted. However, we consider the cloud server to be ''curious but honest,'' which is the same as the previous works [7] , [9] . This means it follows the proposed protocol, but curious about the actual information of encrypted files, the trapdoor, and relevance scores. Preserving the access pattern is too much expensive because the algorithm must access the entire file set [33] . For efficiency, we do not protect the access pattern in our scheme.
C. DESIGN GOALS
To enable an efficient ranked multi-keyword search for multiple data owners over encrypted cloud data, our scheme aims to achieve the following goals:
1) Multi-keyword Ranked Search for Multiple Data Owners: This scheme not only allows multi-keyword searches over encrypted cloud data (which are encrypted with different keys for different data owners) but also allow the cloud server to return the ranked topk encrypted files. 2) Search Efficiency: We explore a tree-based index structure and an efficient search algorithm. The cloud server will merge encrypted indexes without knowing the corresponding sensitive information. The authenticated data user only needs to encrypt query keywords once to efficiently retrieve all files of interest.
3) Security: The scheme proposed should achieve the following three security goals: (1) Keyword Semantic Security (Definition 1). We will prove that TBMSM is semantically secure against the chosen keyword attack under the selective security model. (2) Keyword Security (Definition 2). We will prove that TBMSM realized keyword privacy in the random oracle model. (3) Relevance Score Security. We need to ensure that the cloud server cannot infer the actual value of the encoded relevance scores. Definition 1: Let A be a probability polynomial time adversary, he can ask the challenger C to return the ciphertext with the corresponding keywords. The adversary A sends two keywords w 1 and w 2 with equal length to C. Then the challenger C randomly sets ν ∈ {1, 2} and sends the ciphertext w ν to the adversary A, who continues to ask the challenger C for the ciphertext of keyword w, such that w / ∈ {w 1 , w 2 }. Finally, the adversary A outputs the guess ν ∈ {1, 2}. We define the probability that the adversary A breaks TBMSM to be 
D. NOTATIONS
For clarity, we introduce the main notations mentioned in this paper.
• O -the collection of data owners, denoted as a set of m
• I -the collection of data owners' index, denoted as a set of m indexes I = (I 1 , I 2 , ..., I m ).
• U -data users collection, denoted as a set of n data users U = (U 1 , U 2 , ..., U n ).
• W -the collection of keywords, denoted as a set of η keywords W = (w 1 , w 2 , ..., w η ).
• W i -the keyword collection encrypted by O i , denoted as
•
).
• C i -the encrypted file collection of O i , denoted as a set of d files
• Q i -a subset of W , indicating the keywords in a search request that are submitted by U i , denoted as Q i = (q i,1 , q i,2 , ..., q i,t ).
• T Q i -the trapdoor for Q i , denoted as
E. PRELIMINARIES
In this subsection, we introduce some necessary techniques used in the study.
1) BILINEAR PARING
Let G 1 and G 2 denote two cyclic groups of prime order p. We view G 1 as an additive group and G 2 as a multiplicative group. A bilinear map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 satisfies the following properties:
• Computable: There is a polynomial time algorithm to compute e(g, h) ∈ G 2 , for any g, h ∈ G 1 .
• Non-degenrate: If g is a generator of G 1 ,the e(g, g) is a generator of G 2 .
2) DECISIONAL BILINEAR DIFFIE-HELLMAN (DBDH) ASSUMPTION
The DBDH problem is as follows: given a, b, c, z ∈ Z q as input, whether we can distinguish the tuple (g, g a , g b , g c , e(g, g) abc ) from the tuple (g, g a , g b , g c , e(g, g) z ) . The DBDH assumption states that there is no polynomialtime algorithm that has a non-negligible advantage in solving the DBDH problem.
3) VECTOR SPACE MODEL
The vector space model along with TF × IDF rule is a popular information retrieval model [34] , where TF denotes the frequency of a given keyword appearing in the file and IDF is the logarithm of the total number of files divided by the number of files containing the keyword and get value obtained the logarithm. There are many variations of the TF × IDF weighting scheme. Without loss of generality, we choose a commonly used formula to calculate the relevance score of the document [35] . Given a data file set F = {F 1 , · · · , F d } and a keyword set W = {w 1 , · · · , w η }, we compute the relevance score between
and an arbitrary keyword w j (j ∈ [1, η]) with the following method.
where |F b | denotes the length of the file F b , f F b ,w j denotes the frequency of the keyword w j in the file F b , f w j denotes the number of files containing keyword w j , and N denotes the total number of files, i.e., |F|. Here, we denote the vector of the relevance score of the keywords in the file
Note that the length of the vector of all files is the same (i.e., η); if the file F b does not have the keyword w j , the corresponding jth element in D b should be set as 0.
4) ADDITIVE ORDER AND PRIVACY PRESERVING FUNCTION (AOPPF)
Chor et al. [33] proposed an additive order and privacy preserving function, which helps data owners encrypt the relevance score using a different function. It allows the cloud server to accurately rank the search result files. 
5) KEYWORD BALANCED BINARY TREE (KBB-TREE)
To improve the efficiency of the search, Xia et al. [22] first proposed the keyword balanced binary tree. However, it does not support the multiple data owners' model. In our scheme, each data owner builds a secure keyword balanced binary tree and outsource them to the cloud server. The cloud server merges those index trees and performs the efficiently multikeyword search. Each node in the index tree stores a vector D whose elements are the relevance scores. We define the node in the index tree as
where ID, F ID , and O ID denote the id of node, file and data owner, respectively. P r denotes the pointers to the right child of the u node , and P l denotes the pointers to the left child. The detailed construction of the KBB-tree and the merging method will be discussed in section IV.
IV. TREE-BASED MULTI-KEYWORD RANKED SEARCH SCHEME
In this section, we detail our TBMSM scheme in the following aspects: Overview, System Setup, Keyword Encryption, Index Construction, Secure Indexes Merge, Trapdoor Generation, Efficient Search.
A. OVERVIEW
To meet the requirements of efficient multi-keyword ranked search in multiple data owners model, we propose a novel TBMSM mechanism. Fig. 2 shows the working processes of TBMSM.
1) DATA OWNERS
(1) KeywordsEnc encrypts the keyword with data owners' secret key k o i,w ; (2) FilesEnc utilizes the traditional symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt data owners' files; (3) IndexesEnc builds the tree-based index for each data owner and encrypts the KBB-tree with AOPPF. (4) data owners upload encrypted keywords, files and KBB-trees to the cloud server.
2) DATA USERS
(1) TrapdoorGen generates trapdoors with data users' secret key k u i,w , and then submits trapdoors and the number of extracting files k to the cloud server; (2) FilesDec decrypts encrypted files.
3) THE CLOUD SERVER
(1) IndexesMerg merges multiple encrypted KBB-trees; (2) Multi-keyword Search runs the DFS algorithm to find out the corresponding files and returns the corrected top-k encrypted files to data users.
B. SYSTEM SETUP
Let k denote the security parameter. Both g and g 1 are the generators of cyclic groups G 1 and G 2 with prime order p. Our algorithm randomly produces
p ← (0, 1) * , where k u j ,w is the private key of data user U j used to generate the trapdoor, k o i ,f and k o i ,w are the secret keys of data owner O i for encrypting files and keywords. In addition, let H (•) denote a public hash function whose output belongs to Z + p .
C. KEYWORD ENCRYPTION
To meet the security search requirements, keyword encryption should satisfy the following conditions. First, different data owners can encrypt the same keyword with different private keys, and don't need to share the keys with others. Second, the same keyword should be encrypted to different ciphertext at different times. We assume that data owner O i wants to encrypt the ath keyword w i,a
where r o is a random number. For clarity, we let
D. INDEX CONSTRUCTION
Each data owner builds a KBB-tree for his/her data files. Given a data file set 
To build a KBB-tree for all data files, data owner O i generates a node for each data file 
E. MULTI-SOURCE INDEXES MERGE
When having received the index tree set I = {I 1 , I 2 , · · · , I m } from different data owners, the cloud server merges them into one index tree I merged according to the following steps.
First, the cloud server initializes an empty linkedList and inserts u i,root (u i,root denotes the root of I i , i ∈ [1, m]) to linkedList. Second, the cloud server takes the linkedList as inputs of the Algorithm 1 and gets the root of merged tree.
As data owners utilize different encoding functions to encode their relevance scores, the cloud server therefore cannot directly compare the size of the encoded scores from different data owners. In what follows, we take two files (F 1 and F 2 ) and the h-th keyword w h as an example to explain how to compare the size of the encoded scores with different encoding functions.
Assume the F 1 of data owner O 1 and F 2 of data owner O 2 contain the hth keyword w h . The relevance score S 1,1,h and S 2,2,h are encoded to V 1,1,h and V 2,2,h . First, the cloud server 1 Note that if the number of nodes is not power of two, some dummy nodes (e.g., u = NULL) need be introduced for constructing the KBB tree.
Algorithm 1 BuildIndex
Input: 1 2,h , the relevance score of F 1 is bigger than F 2 , otherwise, the relevance score of F 2 is bigger than F 1 .
F. TRAPDOOR GENERATION
In the multi-owner model, it is not advisable for the data user to communicate with each data owner to generate the trapdoor, so we should satisfy the following two conditions. First, the data user can generate the trapdoor without communicating with others. Second, the same search keyword should generate different trapdoors at different times.
We assume data user U i wants to search keyword w t , and then computes the trapdoor as
where r u is a random number. For clarity, we let T 1 = g k u i ,w ·H (w t )·r u and T 2 = g k u i ,w ·r u , so T w t = (T 1 , T 2 ) and submits it to the cloud server.
G. EFFICIENT SEARCH
When the cloud server receives a search request, it first converts the trapdoor into a search vector and then calls the DFS-algorithm described in algorithm 2 and returns the top-k VOLUME 6, 2018 related files. We assume the cloud server received a trapdoor T w t , and for every encrypted keyword in the keyword set W i , it first computes
The cloud can judge whether w t belongs to the keyword set if the following equation is true and set the ath dimension of the query vector to 1:
Algorithm 2 DFS Input: The IndexTree's node u, query vector q and returned file number k Output: The list RList of top-k ranked encrypted files if the node u is not a leaf node then if getRScore(u, q) > minScore then
Delete the element with the smallest encoded score from RList; end Insert a new element and sort the element of RList; Set minSocre to be equal to the smallest encoded score in RList; end end Fig. 3 shows an example of a search process with query vector q = (0, 0, 1, 1), and the parameter k = 3. The search starts at the root node, and reaches the first leaf node f i,4 with the query relevance score 4.2. Then, the leaf node f i,3 and f i,2 are reached with relevance scores 1.9 and 4.5 respectively. Next, the DFS-algorithm will reach the leaf node f i,1 with the relevance score 1.3, which is smaller than the smallest score in RList. Finally, the elements of RList are sorted by relevance score.
V. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Data files are encrypted by a symmetric encryption algorithm before uploading. As long as the algorithm is safe, the cloud server will not know the contents of files.
1) KEYWORDS AND TRAPDOORS
We give the security analysis of keywords and trapdoors according to the following two theorems. Proof: We first consider a game played between adversary A and challenger C. We assume adversary A has a nonnegligible advantage as the attacker in this game. In the initialization phase, challenger C sets µ randomly. If µ = 0, C sends (A, B, C, Z ) = (g a , g b , g c , g abc ) to A; If µ = 1, C sends (A, B, C, Z ) = (g a , g b , g c , g z ) to A, where a, b, c , z ∈ Z p are randomly generated.
Setup: Challenger C sends public keys (g, g a , g b , g c , Z ) to the adversary A.
Phase 1: C initializes a set of keywords W and sets it to an empty value. A can choose any keyword w and ask C to generate corresponding keyword ciphertext w. If w ∈ W , C just sends w to A; Otherwise, C adds w to W and sends w to A.
Challenge: A sends two keywords w 1 and w 2 with equal length to C, where w 1 , w 2 / ∈ W , C randomly sets ν ∈ {1, 2} and sends the ciphertext
Phase 2: A repeats phase 1 and the only limit is w / ∈ {w 1 , w 2 }.
Guess: A outputs the guess ν ∈ {1, 2}. If ν = ν, then w ν is the ciphertext of w ν , and A outputs µ = 0; Otherwise it outputs µ = 1.
Evidently, A will output ν = ν with probability 1/2 + and output ν = ν with probability 1/2. Therefore, A can win the game with probability 1/2+ /2. In other words, TBMSM is secure against the chosen keyword attack.
Theorem 2: Based on the discrete logarithm assumption, TBMSM realized keyword privacy in the random oracle model.
Proof: We consider a game played between the adversary A and the challenger C as follows.
Setup: The challenger C sends public keys (g, g k 1 , g k 2 ) to the adversary A.
Challenge: After A has submitted t search requests, C randomly chooses keyword w and returns encrypted keyword w = (g k 1 ·H (w )·r 1 , g k 1 ·r 1 ) and trapdoor T w = (g k 2 ·H (w )·r 2 , g k 2 ·r 2 ) to A.
Guess: A outputs the guess w for w and sends it to C. C returns the encrypted keyword w to A. If T w matches w , then A wins the game.
Before outputting the guess w , A already has t keywords and their encrypted keywords. Therefore, the remaining keyword set is η − t, where η is the size of keywords. In addition, because the discrete logarithm problem is hard in polynomial time, the probability that A guess the correct w from w or T w is a negligible probability . Therefore, A can win the game with probability 1 η−t + . 
2) RELEVANCE SCORES
We encode relevance scores with the AOPPF proposed in [33] . We assume the data owner inputs score s and ID i , and sends the encoded score F H (ID i ) aoppf (s) to the cloud server. When the cloud server collects m encoded scores for the same score s, it can construct m equations. However, there are m+1 unknown variables, so the AOPPF cannot be broken based on those information. Therefore, the privacy of the relevance scores has also been protected.
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 1) INDEX ENCRYPTION
Assume that the keyword dictionary and file numbers for each index are defined as u and d. O(d) nodes are generated during the index tree construction, and for each node it takes O(u) time to encrypt it. The time complexity of building an index is O(ud).
2) INDEX MERGE
Assume that there are m index trees to merge. Merging m indexes is equivalent to merging their roots. It takes O(um) to merge these encrypted indexes. Therefore, the time complexity of the merging index is O(um).
3) QUERY
We assume that the number of leaf nodes containing at least one query keyword is n. The time cost to calculate the relevance score is O(u), and the height of the merged index is log d + log m. The search time complexity is less than O(un(log d + log m)), as the top-k queries of n are larger than the number of required files k.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of the TBMSM. First, we introduce the evaluation settings, then compare our proposed scheme with the PRMSM.
A. EVALUATION SETTINGS
Our experiments are conducted using the Java programming language on a PC with a 3.3 GHz Intel Core CPU and 8 GB memory. We use the real datasets, the Internet Request For Comments (RFC) [36] for simulation experiments. This dataset contains 7875 plain text files with a total size of approximately 393MB. Then we extract keywords from the RFC files. Fig. 4 shows the time cost of index construction. Fig. 4a shows the time cost of index construction for the same size of keyword dictionary, which is almost linear with the number of files. This is consistent with our performance analysis. The TBMSM consumes much less time than PRMSM. Fig. 4b shows that, given the same number of files (d = 1000), TBMSM grew by an average of 29.16s, while PRMSM grew by an average of 45.12s. Fig. 4c shows the time cost of the merging operation with the same keyword dictionary (u = 4000) and grows linearly with the number of users. When the number of data owners belongs to {500, 3000}, the time cost values within {1.403s, 8.399s}, which is acceptable. On the other hand, as shown in Fig. 5 (due to the use of balanced binary tree), the TBMSM needs more storage space for the index. However, this is not a problem for the cloud platform. Fig. 6a shows that both the TBMSM and PRMSM are unaffected by the keyword dictionary size for the same number of queried keywords. The TBMSM requires approximately 2.769s to generate trapdoors, while the PRMSM requires 4.618s. In Fig. 6b , given the same number of keyword dictionary sizes (u = 4000), the trapdoor generation time for the TBMSM ranges from 2.769s to 23.588s, while it ranges from 4.618s to 41.044s for PRMSM.
B. EVALUATION RESULTS

1) INDEX CONSTRUCTION
2) TRAPDOOR GENERATION
3) SEARCH Fig. 7 shows that our proposed scheme consumes less time search compared to PRMSM, which matches our search analysis. Fig. 7a shows that given d = 2000 and u = 100, when the number of queried keywords belongs to {1, 10}, the search time in the PRMSM ranges from 4.992s to 46.932s, while our method's search time ranges from 0.572s to 0.72s. Fig. 7b shows that the number of files in the dataset has little effect on the search. Fig. 7c shows that given the same size of queried keywords (t = 5), and the same dataset (d = 2000), when the size of the keyword dictionary increases from 100 to 1000, the TBMSM's search time ranges from 0.63s to 0.834s, only an average of 0.02s, while the PRMSM ranges from 23.31s to 92.947s.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this study, we consider a multiple data owners model in cloud computing and propose an efficient ranked multikeyword search scheme over encrypted data. First, we propose a novel secure search protocol that allows different data owners to encrypt the files and indexes with different keys.
Then, we construct a tree-based index structure for each data owner and encrypt with AOPPF. Meanwhile, the TBMSM allows the cloud server to merge encrypted indexes without knowing any information. The experiment results obtained using the RFC dataset demonstrate that the TBMSM is an efficient mechanism.
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